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Non-malleable-codes introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [DPW18]
encode a classical message $S$ in a manner such that tampering the codeword
results in the decoder either outputting the original message $S$ or a message
that is unrelated/independent of $S$. Providing such non-malleable security for
various tampering function families has received significant attention in
recent years. We consider the well-studied (2-part) split-state model, in which
the message $S$ is encoded into two parts $X$ and $Y$, and the adversary is
allowed to arbitrarily tamper with each $X$ and $Y$ individually. We consider
the security of non-malleable-codes in the split-state model when the adversary
is allowed to make use of arbitrary entanglement to tamper the parts $X$ and
$Y$. We construct explicit quantum secure non-malleable-codes in the
split-state model. Our construction of quantum secure non-malleable-codes is
based on the recent construction of quantum secure $2$-source
non-malleable-extractors by Boddu, Jain and Kapshikar [BJK21].