babylonpolice.com

Many mechanisms behind the evolution of cooperation, such as reciprocity,
indirect reciprocity, and altruistic punishment, require group knowledge of
individual actions. But what keeps people cooperating when no one is looking?
Conformist norm internalization, the tendency to abide by the behavior of the
majority of the group, even when it is individually harmful, could be the
answer. In this paper, we analyze a world where (1) there is group selection
and punishment by indirect reciprocity but (2) many actions (half) go
unobserved, and therefore unpunished. Can norm internalization fill this
"observation gap" and lead to high levels of cooperation, even when agents may
in principle cooperate only when likely to be caught and punished?
Specifically, we seek to understand whether adding norm internalization to the
strategy space in a public goods game can lead to higher levels of cooperation
when both norm internalization and cooperation start out rare. We found the
answer to be positive, but, interestingly, not because norm internalizers end
up making up a substantial fraction of the population, nor because they
cooperate much more than other agent types. Instead, norm internalizers, by
polarizing, catalyzing, and stabilizing cooperation, can increase levels of
cooperation of other agent types, while only making up a minority of the
population themselves.