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Shake to Leak: Fine-tuning Diffusion Models Can Amplify the Generative Privacy Risk

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arXiv:2403.09450v2 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: While diffusion models have recently demonstrated remarkable progress in generating realistic images, privacy risks also arise: published models or APIs could generate training images and thus leak privacy-sensitive training information. In this paper, we reveal a new risk, Shake-to-Leak (S2L), that fine-tuning the pre-trained models with manipulated data can amplify the existing privacy risks. We demonstrate that S2L could occur in various standard fine-tuning strategies for diffusion models, including concept-injection methods (DreamBooth and Textual Inversion) and parameter-efficient methods (LoRA and Hypernetwork), as well as their combinations. In the worst case, S2L can amplify the state-of-the-art membership inference attack (MIA) on diffusion models by $5.4\%$ (absolute difference) AUC and can increase extracted private samples from almost $0$ samples to $15.8$ samples on average per target domain. This discovery underscores that the privacy risk with diffusion models is even more severe than previously recognized. Codes are available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/Shake-to-Leak.

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