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Optimal Interventions in Coupled-Activity Network Games: Application to Sustainable Forestry

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arXiv:2404.13662v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: We consider the problem of promoting sustainability in production forests wherein a given number of strategic entities are authorized to own or manage concession regions. These entities harvest agricultural commodities and sell them in a market. We study optimal price-shaping in a coupled-activity network game model in which the concession owners (agents) engage in two activities: (a) the sustainable activity of producing a commodity that does not interfere with protected forest resources, and (b) the unsustainable activity of infringing into protected regions to expand their agricultural footprint. We characterize two types of policies in a budget-constrained setting: one that maximally suppresses the aggregate unsustainable activity and another that maximizes social welfare while constraining the aggregate unsustainable activity to remain below a predefined tolerance. Our analysis provides novel insights on the agents' equilibrium effort across the two activities and their influence on others due to intra- and cross-activity network effects. We also identify a measure of node centrality that resembles the Bonacich-Katz centrality and helps us determine pricing incentives that lead to welfare improvement while reducing the aggregate unsustainable activity.

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