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Frequency-dependent returns in nonlinear public goods games

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arXiv:2404.13728v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: When individuals interact in groups, the evolution of cooperation is traditionally modeled using the framework of public goods games. Overwhelmingly, these models assume that the return of the public good depends linearly on the fraction of contributors. In contrast, it seems natural that in real life public goods interactions the return most likely depends on the size of the investor pool as well. Here, we consider a model to account for such nonlinearities in which the multiplication factor (marginal per capita return) for the public good depends on how many contribute. We find that nonlinear public goods interactions can break the curse of dominant defection in linear public goods interactions and give rise to richer dynamical outcomes in evolutionary settings. We provide an in-depth analysis of the more varied decisions by the classical rational player in nonlinear public goods interactions as well as a mechanistic, microscopic derivation of the evolutionary outcomes for the stochastic dynamics in finite populations and in the deterministic limit of infinite populations. This kind of nonlinearity provides a natural way to model public goods with diminishing returns as well as economies of scale.

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