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Secret Key Generation Rates for Line of Sight Multipath Channels in the Presence of Eavesdroppers

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arXiv:2404.16481v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: In this paper, the feasibility of implementing a lightweight key distribution scheme using physical layer security for secret key generation (SKG) is explored. Specifically, we focus on examining SKG with the received signal strength (RSS) serving as the primary source of shared randomness. Our investigation centers on a frequency-selective line-of-sight (LoS) multipath channel, with a particular emphasis on assessing SKG rates derived from the distributions of RSS. We derive the received signal distributions based on how the multipath components resolve at the receiver. The mutual information (MI) is evaluated based on LoS 3GPP channel models using a numerical estimator. We study how the bandwidth, delay spread, and Rician K-factor impact the estimated MI. This MI then serves as a benchmark setting bounds for the SKG rates in our exploration.

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