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arXiv:2310.10530v4 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: In Bayesian theory, the role of information is central. The influence exerted by prior information on posterior outcomes often jeopardizes Bayesian studies, due to the potentially subjective nature of the prior choice. In modeling where a priori knowledge is lacking, the reference prior theory emerges as a proficient tool. Based on the criterion of mutual information, this theory makes it possible to construct a non-informative prior whose choice can be qualified as objective. In this paper, we contribute to the enrichment of reference prior theory. Indeed, we unveil an original analogy between reference prior theory and Global Sensitivity Analysis, from which we propose a natural generalization of the mutual information definition. Leveraging dissimilarity measures between probability distributions, such as f-divergences, we provide a formalized framework for what we term generalized reference priors. Our main result offers a limit of mutual information, simplifying the definition of reference priors as its maximal arguments. This approach opens a new way that facilitates the theoretical derivation of reference priors under constraints or within specific classes. In the absence of constraints, we further prove that the Jeffreys prior maximizes the generalized mutual information considered.